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EXCUSING INFORMATION-PROVISION CRIMES IN THE BUREAUCRATIC STATE 
Jeremy Horder*  
Criminalisation and the Duty of Co-operation 
Few people are against moves towards participatory democracy as an 
end in itself: the promotion of (to cite a recent European Report) the, 
‘extent to which [European] citizens believe that political decision-
making can be influenced through their own actions’.1 We already live, 
though, in a different - and less agreeable   -  form of participatory 
state; and English criminal law plays an important role in creating and 
sustaining it. We live in a  state that can be called the ‘bureaucratic-
participatory’ state.  
In the bureaucratic-participatory state, the relevant measurement  
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of participation,  as  a means to an end,  is the extent to which citizens 
can be persuaded2  or coerced into contributing to better bureaucratic  
decision-making in the ‘public interest’. In the bureaucratic-participatory 
state, good citizens are not pro-active citizens who themselves try   
directly  to exercise influence  by participating in political and social 
decision-making. From a bureaucratic perspective, that kind of  
‘amateur’  influence  would be insufficiently conducive to, say, Pareto 
efficiency in generating outcomes in regulatory contexts.3 On the 
contrary, in the bureaucratic-participatory state,  political and social 
decision-making should remain in the hands of a professional and expert 
executive: in the hands of what Pareto himself describes as (a part of) 
the ‘governing elite’.4 Instead, the good citizen of the bureaucratic-
participatory state is the co-operative, honest and truthful citizen. The 
good citizen is to play a role as such a citizen when dealing, amongst 
other things, with  officials whose task it is to secure regulatory goals. 
For, as  Robert Alford puts it (in broadly game-theoretic terms): 
                                                          
2
 For example, by ‘nudges’, such as incentives to provide data, on oneself or on others, that may be useful to 
Government agencies in performing their tasks. On nudging generally, see Karen Yeung, ‘Nudge as Fudge’ 
(2012) 74 MLR 122. I will be concentrating on ‘shove’ rather than on ‘nudge’, i.e. on criminal or regulatory 
sanctioning for non-compliance. 
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the elites…that dominate society are responsible and far-sighted 
enough to realise that they must co-ordinate their activities with 
others [such as citizens]…because they realise that they are 
dependent upon each other in the long run.5   
In seeking to achieve such co-ordination, the criminal law may play an 
important role. The bureaucratic-participatory state may be content 
merely to nudge (persuade) people, rather than to coerce them, into 
feeding views and opinions into its decision-making.6  However, the 
bureaucratic-participatory state is prepared to shove (coerce) people 
when it comes to the provision, not of opinion, but of information or 
analogous forms of co-operation deemed necessary to the state’s 
decision-making. My focus is on that kind of coercion.7  
Here is an old example where a court gave its backing to such a 
bureaucratic strategy. In Stevens v Steeds Ltd,8 D was charged, under 
Regulation 42 of Rationing Order No. 1856 (SR & O 1939), with 
knowingly or recklessly making a false statement, ‘for the purposes of 
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purposes. See Ian Brown, ‘Government Access to Private Sector Data in the United Kingdom’ (2012) 2 
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obtaining any rationed food’. In holding that the offence was committed 
as soon as the false statement was knowingly or recklessly made, Lord 
Caldecote laid emphasis on: 
[the] obvious importance to the food department to have accurate 
returns for the purpose of distributing available supplies and of 
estimating the supplies that will be required in the future.9 
Early twentieth century penal interventionism, manifested by offences of 
this kind, was not solely driven by the war effort,10 but our concerns are 
with the modern bureaucratic-participatory state. In more recent times, 
we find the Department for Work and Pensions taking a similar 
approach: 
The Department for Work and Pensions is committed to the 
prevention, detection, correction, investigation and, where 
appropriate, prosecution of fraudulent benefit claims. The aim is to 
prevent criminal offences occurring by making it clear to our 
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customers that they have a responsibility to provide accurate and 
timely information about their claims.11 
In the pursuit of this strategy, we should note the form of law that 
is the main instrument of the bureaucratic-participatory state. This is the 
‘bureaucratic-administrative’ form of law. The bureaucratic-
administrative form of law stands for the view that the interests of 
individuals are subordinate to common or public interests. In pursuing 
the public interest, this form of law places considerable emphasis on, 
‘the universality of rules and the precise definition of terms, [and on]…  
the concepts of intra and ultra vires’, because these values contribute to 
efficiency and predictability.12  Even so, in some instances, the 
bureaucratic-administrative form of law may also favour open-textured 
rules, or the use of discretion by officials. The latter techniques of 
regulation will be preferred, if they are more likely to further the public 
interest than spelling out individuals’ rights and obligations with 
precision.13   
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 DWP, Sanction Policy: In Respect of Fraudulent Social Security Benefit Claims (April 2010), paras 2.1-2.2.  
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In the field of criminal law, the bureaucratic-administrative form of 
law is associated primarily with the use of coercion to underpin state 
regulation, and is symbolised by the strict liability offence.14  The 
overriding commitment of the bureaucratic-administrative form of law to 
promoting the public interest  means that its focus is most commonly 
not the question, ‘Who is to blame?,’ for imperilling or damaging the 
public interest. Instead, the key question is, ‘Who should be incentivised 
(as by a coercive threat), and in what way, most effectively to reduce 
the risk of damage to – or to promote - the public interest?  According 
to Kamenka and Tay, with this form of law: 
its fundamental concern is with consequences rather than with 
fault or mens rea, with public need or public interest…rather than 
private rights and individual duties. Bureaucratic-administrative 
regulation, as Pashukanis saw, elevates the socio-technical norm 
against the private right of Gesellschaft and the traditions and 
organic living together of the Gemeinschaft.15  
A well-known illustration is the obligation on those doing business 
in the regulated sector to make a ‘suspicious activity report’ (‘SAR’), 
                                                          
14
 Although in practice regulatory offences inspired by this form of law are very varied. For example, a fault-
based offence may be placed at the top of a hierarchy of sanctions, for the worst or most persistent offenders. 
See, generally, Law Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts (CP No 195, 2010). 
15
 N 12, 140. We will come on shortly to the role of the ‘Gemeinschaft’ and ‘Gesellschaft’ forms of law in the 
definition of criminal offences. 
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under section 330 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. This obligation 
arises when,  in the course of someone’s regulated business, information 
comes to them that another person may have been laundering money. 
In such circumstances, section 330 of the 2002 Act  makes it an offence 
not to report the suspicion to the relevant authority as soon as is 
practicable.16  One might suppose that breach of such a reporting 
obligation would not be punishable, especially by a sentence of 
imprisonment, unless something had alerted the defendant to the 
possibility that a person with whom they were dealing might be 
laundering money. The primary concern, though, of bureaucratic-
administrative law is with maximizing the effectiveness of incentives, 
rather than with individual blame. Accordingly,  criminal liability arises 
under section 330 not only when the defendant was suspicious (or, of 
course, actually in the know), but also when there were reasonable 
grounds  for the defendant to suspect or know that the other person 
was engaged in money laundering. The main interest of the legislation is 
thus ‘diachronic.’ The main interest is the establishment of an ongoing 
(unpaid) duty on  businesses handling money not to miss an opportunity 
to ‘blow the whistle’ on possible money launderers. This is  considered 
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 The offence is punishable at trial on indictment by a sentence of up to 5 years’ imprisonment. Over 350,000 
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to be the best means over time effectively to promote the public interest 
in an economy fuelled by clean money.17 The synchronic interest in 
identifying blameworthy wrongdoers in particular cases is very much a 
secondary concern.  
We have come a long way, in developing the bureaucratic state, 
since  AJP Taylor expressed the view (surely, even then a considerable 
simplification?) that, ‘until August 1914 a sensible, law-abiding 
Englishman could pass through life and hardly notice the existence of 
the state, beyond the post office and the policeman’.18  I will be  
discussing some further examples of obligations to be co-operative by 
being honest, truthful or helpful:  obligations  imposed by the state in 
the interests of furthering bureaucratic-administrative goals,  and 
backed by criminal or regulatory sanctions.  
Fault and the Obligation to Assist the Authorities 
My thesis  will be a relatively modest one. I will leave until the 
conclusion the large question of whether more use of nudging (providing 
incentives to act or dis-incentives not to act) rather than shoving 
(threatening sanctions for action or failure to act) would in some 
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 Peter Sproat, ‘An Evaluation of the UK’s Anti-Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Regime’ (2007) 47 
Criminal Law and Social Change 169. 
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 AJP Taylor, England 1914-1945 (Clarendon Press, 1965), 1. 
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contexts make for a more proportionate response to failures by citizens 
to provide information or co-operation required by state officials. I will 
not be concerned at all with whether society should scale back its 
regulatory ambitions, or with whether it should seek to achieve those 
ambitions with more or  less by way of input from citizens, businesses 
and other agencies. I will concentrate on how to define criminal offences 
used to coerce people into providing information. My particular focus will 
be the way that people should be judged when they have failed to 
provide the right information, as required. I will use as a basic setting 
for this focus,  Scholmit  Wallerstein’s helpful distinction between two 
kinds of obligation to help the authorities: direct and indirect.19 
My concern will be with direct obligations of assistance. Such 
obligations come in the form of the duty oneself to provide (correct) 
information, and  to answer questions truthfully and honestly, when 
faced with  official demands. Direct assistance obligations of this kind  
should be contrasted with indirect obligations of assistance. Indirect 
obligations to help principally involve a duty to co-operate by not 
obstructing law enforcement authorities, when the authorities are 
themselves engaged in a search, exercising a judgement on the basis of 
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 Schlomit  Wallerstein, ‘On the Legitimacy of Imposing Direct and Indirect Obligations to Disclose Information 
on Non-Suspects’, in GR Sullivan and Ian Dennis, Seeking Security: Pre-empting the Commission of Criminal 
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observation, conducting an inspection, or the like.20  What will be my 
case, so far as alleged breaches of direct assistance obligations under 
regulatory law are concerned?  My case will be  that there is a need for 
greater formal protection of the accused (‘D’) from conviction when D 
has failed to provide the right information, protection going beyond that 
which is provided by following requirements of fairness and due process 
prior to trial. Central to my case will be the importance of providing a 
formal ‘reasonable excuse’ or absence of dishonesty defence, as an 
excusing condition applicable to such offences.21   
As we will see, this role for a dishonesty requirement will involve it 
operating more like a reasonable excuse defence. It will hence have a 
broader role than the one it plays under the Theft Act 1968 (the ‘1968 
Act’). For example, I will argue that a failure to provide the right 
information might not be regarded as dishonest – or might be subject to 
a reasonable excuse defence – if D had severe difficulty in providing the 
right information, or if D could not for some other compelling reason 
reasonably be expected to provide it as required.  In that regard, I will 
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 Wallerstein, n 19.  
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 My main focus will be on dishonesty, rather than on ‘reasonable excuse’, even though the latter may be an 
acceptable alternative. This is because so much of the law I discuss employs dishonesty (if it employs any fault 
or excuse element at all) rather than ‘reasonable excuse’. Developing my thesis in terms of a dishonesty 
‘excuse’ helps to link the discussion to the analysis of theft that is to follow. However, not much ultimately 
hangs on the use of that term. As under section 330 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, a defence of 
‘reasonable excuse’ does broadly the same kind of work, even though the burden may be on the accused 
respecting the latter. 
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concentrate on direct obligations imposed on benefit claimants to 
provide accurate financial information.22  Putting aside cases of fraud 
contrary to the Fraud Act 2006, benefit claimants may fail to provide the 
right information about their claims,  and then find themselves charged 
with an offence, or facing a penalty, bearing on that failure.23 I shall 
argue that when that happens, the case for an excuse such as lack of 
dishonesty or the presence of reasonable excuse is morally far more 
compelling than it is when (say) taxpayers face analogous offences or 
penalties. That is because the need for a dishonesty or reasonable 
excuse provision can be made to depend on the status (for example, 
economic or social) of the person under the obligation.   
 Every criminal lawyer is familiar with the demand that there should 
be no criminal liability without proof of fault (‘actus non facit reum nisi 
mens sit rea’). That demand may sometimes go too far, and sometimes 
not far enough, in regulatory contexts. ‘Bureaucratic’ criminal offences – 
as a dimension integral to the regulatory schemes of which they form a 
part – promote the public interest by incentivising particular groups 
(road users, farmers, gun owners, tax payers, benefit claimants, and so 
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 For a broader examination, see Dee Cook, Rich Law, Poor Law: Different Responses to Tax and 
Supplementary Benefit Fraud (Open University Press, 1989). I am very grateful to Niki Lacey for this reference. 
23
 I shall not be considering the relevance of the offence of fraud here, because in some circumstances, a 
benefit fraud could be far more serious than a tax fraud, and there is no reason that the definition of fraud 
should differ as between benefit fraud and tax fraud. 
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on) to plan and behave in certain ways. As people seek to negotiate 
their way through the regulatory ‘space,’ given the specialised focus of 
many regulatory regimes on particular groups, it is permissible – and 
may be morally required - to define the offences that support those 
regimes in such a way that the offences reflect special characteristics 
and circumstances affecting members of the group. Such an approach 
may licence the legislature to dispense with a fault requirement; or, 
contrariwise, it may demand that the legislature use particular kinds of 
fault elements, not just any fault element. I shall argue that, for a 
variety of social, economic and personal reasons, the burden of coping 
with a strict liability regime is disproportionately harsh on those living on 
benefits. Furthermore, in this context, we will see that such harshness is 
not sufficiently mitigated by an insistence on proof of just any fault 
requirement, even a requirement of knowledge that (say) a financial 
statement is or may be false at the time it is made. 
  Dishonesty: Justification and Excuse 
In what follows, as I have indicated, I will be concerned with the more 
developed jurisprudence concerning ‘dishonesty’, rather than with the 
less well-developed analysis of ‘reasonable excuse’, as a fault or defence 
element. The role of dishonesty is best known in the definition of theft 
13 
 
under the Theft Act 1968.24  Under section 1 of the 1968 Act, proof that 
theft has been committed requires proof that someone dishonestly 
appropriated property belonging to another, with an intention to deprive 
the other permanently of the property. What is the role of dishonesty 
under section 1?  It is common to describe the element of dishonesty in 
theft as a fault or mens rea element, but that conceals a complexity 
about the relationship between the conduct and fault elements of theft.  
The requirement of dishonesty makes theft what John Gardner 
calls a, ‘fault-anticipating’ offence. This is an offence where the 
circumstances of justification or excuse are by and large captured by the 
fault element.25 A crime that is committed only if the relevant elements 
are engaged in or brought about ‘intentionally’ is not fault-anticipating. 
Quite obviously, the plain fact that something was intentionally done in 
itself tells us nothing about what justification or excuse, if any is needed, 
there was for doing it.26 By contrast, if an act was done ‘dishonestly’ 
then that tells us something about more the defendant’s fault (as in the 
case of a finding that an act was done ‘recklessly’27). It tells us that the 
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 Theft Act 1968, s 1. 
25
 John Gardner, ‘Wrongs and Faults’, in AP Simester, Appraising Strict Liability (Oxford University Press, 2005) 
51, at 67-70. See also, Jeremy Horder, Excusing Crime (Oxford University Press, 2004), 48-50. 
26
 For the view that almost any action (even something as commonplace as eating a meal in a restaurant) may, 
in some circumstances, call for justification, see Samuel Sheffler, Human Morality (Oxford University Press, 
1994), ch 1. 
27
 See Alan Norrie, ‘Subjectivism, Objectivism and the Limits of Criminal Recklessness’ [1992] 12 OJLS 45. 
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act was in some sense unjustified, and lacked adequate excuse. To go 
into a restaurant and eat a meal like any normal diner is to appropriate 
property belonging to another, with the intention of permanently 
depriving the other of it.28 However, the act is not dishonest, and hence 
not theft of the meal, because there is a perfectly sound justification for 
doing as the diner does: the diner accepts the restaurateur’s invitation 
to do exactly as he or she does, in eating the meal. Had the diner eaten 
the meal with no intention of paying at the end as expected, then the 
diner would have been dishonest when appropriating the meal. In such 
a case, dishonestly is playing a normative, inculpatory role. It is defining 
the wrong itself - what ought not to have been done - and is not just 
determining whether or not someone was to blame for something 
wrongly done.29  
A similar line of reasoning applies in excuse cases. Suppose that I 
mistakenly think that you have eaten your fill at your birthday party, and 
so I consume the remains of the delicious slice of cake that you had 
intentionally put aside for yourself. I do not act dishonestly in 
appropriating your cake with the intention of permanent deprivation. My 
act – albeit unjustified - is excusable, given my genuine mistake about 
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 This analysis follows from the decision in DPP v Gomez [1993] AC 442 (HL). 
29
 See W Chan and AP Simester, ‘Four Functions of Mens Rea’ (2011) 70 CLJ 381. 
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your intentions.30 Note, though, that my excuse claim has a justificatory 
element to it; but this is not a justification for the act itself (I know that 
my act of cake-eating was unjustified). Instead, it is an agent-
perspectival justification. Given the facts as I believed them to be, I 
thought I was justified in doing as I did.31 Such a factual, ‘claim of right’ 
basis for denying dishonesty, when it includes for this purpose facts 
about the law, is partially acknowledged in section 2 of the 1968 Act. 
Section 2 stipulates that D is not to be regarded as dishonest, ‘if [D] 
appropriates the property in the belief that he has in law the right to 
deprive the other of it…’.  
The agent-perspectival justificatory dimension to excuse is not 
limited to beliefs about facts. It may extend to beliefs about morality, 
aggregate welfare, or any other values that provide a basis for justifying 
action agent-perspectivally.32   Following the Court of Appeal’s decision 
in R v Ghosh,33 it is open to the trial court to find that a defendant is not 
dishonest on one of two grounds: either, (a) their conduct was, in the 
circumstances, not dishonest, judged by the standards of ordinary 
                                                          
30
 Hence, in this example, by way of contrast with the last, dishonesty is playing an ascriptive role, to do with 
blame. See Jeremy Horder, Excusing Crime (Oxford University Press, 2004), 48-50. If, in this example, I believed 
that you would have consented to my eating the cake, had you known of the circumstances, then my lack-of-
dishonesty claim is directly covered by section 2(1)(b) of the 1968. Section 2(1)(b) in the text following n. 47. 
31
 See Jeremy Horder, n.  28. John Gardner, ‘Justifications and Reasons’, in John Gardner, Offences and 
Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2007), ch 5. 
32
 Jeremy Horder, n 28. 
33
 R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053. 
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honest people or (b) even if their conduct was dishonest by such 
standards, they did not realise this at the time. This definition has been 
much criticised, and better alternatives proposed,34 but that is not my 
concern here. The significant point is that the Ghosh definition of 
dishonesty is perfectly capable of accommodating active justificatory 
claims where the defendant’s agent-perspectival justification is value-
based, not fact based.35 That being so, the tribunal of fact may take into 
account a wide range of excusatory factors, in deciding whether 
someone’s conduct was dishonest.  
In that regard, we should note that the 1968 Act’s own partial 
definition of dishonesty expressly includes at least one example of a 
value-based, activity justificatory claim. This example is in section 
2(1)(c) of the 1968 Act, which says that D is not to be regarded as 
dishonest if he or she appropriates property, ‘in the belief that the 
person to whom the property belongs cannot be discovered by taking 
reasonable steps.’ Commentators discussing this example tend to 
highlight only the contrast between the purely subjective element in it – 
D’s belief about the circumstances in which the owner might be 
discoverable by taking certain steps - and the objective requirement 
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 See, for example, K Campbell, ‘The Test of Dishonesty in Ghosh’ [1994] 43 CLJ 349. 
35
 See following paragraph, and text at n 47. 
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that, on the facts as D believed them to be, D must not have ruled out 
steps it would in fact be reasonable to take to find the owner.36 Such an 
analysis overlooks the fact that what makes salient D’s belief that ex 
hypothesi  reasonable steps will not uncover the owner (D’s fact-based, 
actively justificatory belief) is a further, value-based belief. This is the 
belief that, in such circumstances, D has a moral claim – a form of 
reasonable excuse - to treat the property as his or her own (D’s value-
based, agent-perspectival belief).37 
Dishonesty: Beyond the Gesellschaft  ‘Claim of Right’ 
The breadth of the basis on which dishonesty can be denied – in effect, 
operating in a fault-anticipating way38 as a limited ‘reasonable excuse’ 
defence - has meant that the decision in Ghosh has found few friends 
amongst scholarly commentators.39 Commentators have found 
particularly objectionable the possibility that D can be found not guilty of 
theft when he or she seeks to justify the appropriation of another’s 
                                                          
36
 See, e.g. Simester and Sullivan et al, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, 5
th
 ed (Hart 
Publishing, 2013), 546-47. 
37
 One can resist the idea that a value-based belief is the basis here for denying dishonesty, only by performing 
an analytical conjuring trick. This involves deeming V’s property right to be extinguished, as soon as V cannot 
be discovered by taking ‘reasonable’ steps. That this is just a trick is demonstrated by the fact that it makes V’s 
ex ante rights subject to ex post facto negation through an incommensurable and purely consequentialist 
value-judgment: how much effort would have to be put in to discover V’s identity, as compared with the 
market (and also sentimental?) value of the property? 
38
 See John Gardner, n 25 above. 
39
 It is notable, though, that Campbell’s critical reformulation of the Ghosh test would preserve the right of the 
fact-finder to acquit D, if the fact-finder was prepared to excuse D’s failure to recognise that his or her own 
behaviour would be regarded as dishonest by the standards of ordinary people: see Campbell, n 34. 
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property on the basis of the value it has to him or her, as compared with 
the value to an un-consenting owner.40 Along such lines, Simester and 
Sullivan thunder: 
It is vital to the authority of a legal system that its laws set an 
objective touchstone. Law works by preventing people from doing 
what they want, through imposing a standard of acceptable 
behaviour and demanding that they conform to that standard. If 
the values that the law would have us act upon were displaced, in 
each case, by those of the particular defendant, then the law 
would have no standard to impose.41 
I do not want to comment on the appropriateness of this narrow view of 
dishonesty as it would apply to the 1968 Act. Perhaps, for example, 
cases like the one in which someone pockets money that they have 
found in the street are best dealt with as matters for sentence 
mitigation, rather than forming the basis for a denial of dishonesty and 
hence a denial that the offence was committed. Nonetheless, we should 
note the narrow,  ‘neo-Hegelian’ roots of the wish to treat only fact-
                                                          
40
 See Edward Griew, ‘Dishonesty: The Objections to Feely and Ghosh’ [1985] Crim LR 341. 
41
 AP Simester and GR Sullivan et al, n 36, 549. The authors regard as preferable a test for dishonesty that is 
actively justificatory only in relation to the facts (including legal facts), a test that excludes  agent-perspectival 
justifications when they relate to value judgements. An example of such a test is  the test under section 217 of 
the Crimes (New Zealand) Act 1961.  For a broadly similar suggestion, see Andrew Halpin, ‘The Test for 
Dishonesty’ [1996] Crim LR 283. 
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based, actively justificatory beliefs as having an excusatory character in 
crimes of dishonesty. On a Hegelian account of fault, excuses should be 
provided in law only where, as Alan Brudner puts it, ‘the accused, 
through lack of fault, meant no challenge to the intersubjective basis of 
right’.42  What that means is that Ds can be excused when they mistake 
the relevant facts, in taking another’s property with an intention of 
permanent deprivation; but Ds should on no account be excused where 
they considered that they had a better moral claim to the property. 
 The narrowness of the neo-Hegelian perspective is linked to its 
limited, ‘Gesellschaft’ account of the forms and limits of law.43 Amongst 
other things, that account: 
Emphasises…precise legal provisions and definitions and the 
rationality and predictability of legal administration. It is oriented 
to the precise definition of the rights and duties of the individual 
through a sharpening of the point at issue and not the day to day 
ad hoc maintenance of…community traditions and organic 
solidarity.44 
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 Alan Brudner, The Unity of the Common Law (University of California Press, 1995), 244. 
43
 The account that follows is drawn from Eugene Kamenka and Alice Erh-Soon Tay, n 12.  
44
 Kamenka and Tay, n 12, at 137.  
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The ad hoc maintenance of,  ‘community traditions and organic 
solidarity’ is, of course, characteristic of the contrasting ‘Gemeinschaft’ 
form of law.45 Under the Gemeinschaft   form of law and ideology, there 
is little if any distinction between, ‘the civil wrong and the criminal 
offence; between politics, justice and administration, between political 
issues, legal issues and moral issues’.46  Under the Gemeinschaft  form 
of law: 
Justice is…substantive, directed to a particular case in a particular 
social context and not to the establishment  of a general rule or 
precedent except…when the taboos protecting the social structure 
are involved.47 
The Gemeinschaft   form of law finds expression in section 2(1)(b) 
of the 1968 Act. Section 2(1)(b) says that D is not to be found dishonest 
if he appropriates property, ‘in the belief that he would have the other’s 
consent if the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of 
it’. Suppose D, knowing that his neighbour has gone on holiday for two 
weeks, sees that milk is still being delivered to the neighbour’s door. D 
consumes the milk, thinking that, because they are friendly neighbours, 
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the neighbour would have consented, had he or she known of the 
appropriation and of its circumstances. In such a case, D can rely 
directly on section 2(1)(b), without having to fall back on the Ghosh 
definition of dishonesty. The significance of section 2(1)(b) is that D’s 
claim to acquittal involves neither an appeal to nor, nor a challenge to, 
what Brudner calls, ‘the intersubjective basis of right’. That is because 
D’s claim is not a rights-focused denial of dishonesty. Instead, it is an 
appeal to a common understanding or social convention: something that 
the owner, as a fellow member of the moral community, should 
acknowledge. This understanding or convention concerns the potential 
for some ex hypothesi   non-consensual takings to involve a substantive 
justice that the law can leave open to recognition by the tribunal of fact. 
These understandings and conventions transcend the Gesellschaft-
inspired language and practice of rights. They involve no crude 
opposition between V’s actual ‘right’ and D’s ‘claim of right’.  
Section 2(1)(b) of the 1968 Act is a manifestation of a wider point 
about the dishonesty requirement. The dishonesty requirement has 
largely resisted attempts by orthodox theorists to cabin it within a 
Gesellschaft  structure for understanding excuses. Instead, more 
consistent with a Gemeinschaft  understanding of law, the dishonesty 
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requirement remains fully compatible with an ad hoc, case-by-case 
approach in which, in the hands of the tribunal of fact, securing trial 
fairness through the application of community values plays a significant 
a role  alongside respect for defendants with fact-based, actively 
justificatory claims of right. The former is, if you will, the criminal law’s 
communitarian yin to its Hegelian yang. The threat to what Simester and 
Sullivan refer to as, ‘the authority of a legal system’48 involved in this 
broad understanding of dishonesty is in fact very limited.49   
Simester and Sullivan complain that the inherent uncertainty of the 
Ghosh test means that we cannot decide whether, for example, 
releasing battery hens from captivity for ethical reasons is always theft, 
because we cannot say whether such a practice offends against the 
standards of ordinary, honest people. They continue: 
Obviously, if different persons can reasonably hold different views 
about…[such] questions, there is a real danger of different 
verdicts, on the same set of facts, from different juries. In turn, 
this undermines the rule of law.50 
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This critique overlooks two points. First, if dishonesty is a concealed 
excuse for a harmful wrongdoing (as argued earlier), then – like, say, 
the defences of reasonable excuse, or duress - it is arguably not subject 
to the same demands of certainty and predictability in its definition as 
the conduct rules whose definitive application it qualifies.51  Secondly, 
Simester and Sullivan’s critique airbrushes from the picture the strongly 
Gemeinschaft  strain of thought and practice  that may come to the fore 
in trials where the dishonesty requirement has been put in issue, a 
requirement that permits a more open-ended, evaluative pursuit of 
justice on a case by case basis.  
Excusing Conditions and the Forms of Law 
When it comes to excusing conditions (or defences more broadly), there 
will inevitably be tensions between the demands of the different forms 
of law. As I have said, the bureaucratic-administrative form of law – like 
the Gesellschaft  form of law - may value clarity and predictability about 
the circumstances of excuse (or of any defence, whether or not 
excusatory). A classic example of that preference in action is to be found 
in the precisely circumscribed and highly detailed defences, under 
section 444 of the Education Act 1996, to the offence of failing to ensure 
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that a child attends regularly at school. But there ends the common 
ground on defences between the two forms of law. If and when there is 
a need for a more open-ended approach to defences, the bureaucratic-
administrative form of law will favour an approach under which officials 
control the circumstances of excuse, so that public (diachronic) interests 
are not threatened by (synchronic) concerns about individual culpability. 
Such an approach would, of course, be anathema to the rights-based 
gesellschaft  form of law. 
In this, the bureaucratic-administrative form of law shares 
something in its approach with the Gemeinschaft  form of law. On the 
one hand, the latter, unlike the former, is concerned more with securing 
individual justice in particular cases in context than with the 
establishment of general rules. On the other hand, under the 
Gemeinschaft  form of law, the maintenance of community tradition and 
solidarity – one form of common interest - is always liable to take 
preference over the untrammelled assertion of individual rights. In 
consequence, for some defendants, the Gemeinschaft  form and 
ideology of law poses a threat when they claim excuse. That is because 
the authoritative ‘community tradition’ within this form of law, what 
gives people a sense of being bound together, may turn out to be 
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constituted by deep-seated prejudices against certain kinds of excuse-
seeking defendant. This means that such a  defendant - say, a benefit 
claimant – may find him or herself in the awkward position of having to 
square a morally sound claim to excuse with a recognition that, as a 
member of the community, he or she is obliged to frame a defence 
narrative in such a way that it adequately accommodates the 
community’s predisposition to regard him or her as one of the 
supposedly ‘idle, undeserving poor’.52 
Whatever its broader limitations as a model for law and politics, I 
suggest that it is only under the Gesellschaft  form and ideology of law – 
with its emphasis on individual rights - that someone will confidently be 
able to make an unambiguous assertion of entitlement to excuse. For, 
only the Gesellschaft form of law is fully at ease with the ‘republican’ 
model of citizenship, in which, when seeking to establish a defence, 
citizens: 
Do not have to bow or scrape , toady or kowtow, fawn or flatter; they 
do not have to placate any others with beguiling smiles or mincing 
steps. In short they do not have to live on their wits, whether out of 
fear or deference…[By contrast, they can]…walk tall among [their] 
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fellows, conscious of sharing in the general recognition that no one 
can push [them] around with an expectation of impunity.53 
This language might appear to be language more appropriate for 
justification than for excuse; but claims of lack of dishonesty or of 
reasonable excuse tend to blur such categories, and I will not be further 
concerned with these categories here.54 In the bureaucratic-participatory 
state, what is needed properly to acknowledge excuses (or justifications) 
for information-provision failures is a structure that marries this 
republican ideal, with a Gemeinschaft  emphasis on the importance of 
doing justice in its context on a case by case basis. As I have indicated, 
I will use benefit offences as a proving ground for this approach in 
English law. 
‘Domination’ and the use of coercion to acquire information 
A failure to provide information can be a straightforward instance of 
harmful wrongdoing, or of the direct posing of a threat of such 
wrongdoing. For example, I may be liable to conviction for fraud if, 
owing you a legal duty of disclosure, I dishonestly intend cause you loss, 
to put your finances at risk, or to make a gain myself, by failing to 
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reveal certain information to you.55   However, a failure to provide 
information may be prohibited in cases beyond those in which wrongful 
harm has in fact been done, or where there is a more or a less direct 
threat of wrongful harm. Such a failure may be prohibited even when 
the failure of one individual to provide the information in question may 
involve only insignificant – or no - wrongful harming, or a threat thereof.  
Such a failure may be prohibited when, if too many individuals fail to 
provide that information, this will cause or threaten significant harm 
through diminution of what regulation theorists call a ‘common pool’ 
resource.56  The ‘tax take’,  or the total sum available to be paid in 
benefits,  are examples of common pool resources. The significance of 
common pool resources is that, whilst each individual who takes too 
much benefit or pays too little tax may make an almost wholly 
insignificant, de minimis inroad on a vast common pool, if too many 
people behaved in that way, the common pool would be unacceptably 
diminished.57  Hence, in such circumstances, it is justifiable to prohibit 
any act that diminishes the common pool, other than in accordance with 
the scheme authoritatively laid down to govern its diminution. 
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We should assume that there can be distributive justice-based 
duties, generated by a common pool resource situation, sufficiently 
important to warrant the threat of criminalisation for breaches of those 
duties. A significant question now arises, in relation to the two common 
pool resources I have mentioned: the tax take, and the benefit pool. 
Should the approach to criminalisation of a breach of these duties be the 
same in each case, the case of a failure to provide information relevant 
to a tax return, and the case of a failure to provide information relevant 
to a benefit claim? My tentative answer is ‘no’. Cases of failure to 
provide information relevant to a benefit claim should be criminalised 
only when they are dishonest, whereas – in general terms – 
criminalisation of failures to provide information relevant to a tax return 
may be a legitimate course of action even when the failures are not 
dishonest.58  
Most income earners - those who pay tax on income sufficient to 
live on -  enjoy, in virtue of that status, a basis for  what I will call ‘non-
dependent engagement’ with society. Non-dependent engagement with 
society is engagement that is not subject to ‘domination’ in key respects, 
such as in relation to entitlement to an income. In that regard, 
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domination bears something like its republican meaning: direct 
discretionary (state) control over key aspects of people’s lives.59   Those 
earning enough to be taxpayers enjoy the benefits of non-dependent 
engagement with society (whether or not as citizens). They are not 
subject to state domination, in relation to their entitlement to an 
income, their entitlement being governed by contractual rights and 
duties even when the employer is the state. To that extent at least, they 
are autonomous. By contrast, those who are substantially reliant on 
benefits experience ‘dependence engagement’ with society.   Someone’s 
engagement with society is dependent if it is subject to significant 
domination. Such a person is directly subject to the discretion of the 
state, and dependent on the state when it comes to the possibility of 
enjoying an autonomous life. This happens to benefit claimants when it 
is wholly within the state’s gift to set levels of benefit, wholly for the 
state to decide if benefits should be withdrawn or reduced, and so on. I 
will assume, without further argument, that the state has a special duty 
of care to those wholly or substantially dependent on it financially for 
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the possibility of living an autonomous life. As David Donnison puts it, 
this duty arises because, amongst other things: 
To keep people out of poverty, people must have an income which 
enables them to participate in the life of the community…[T]hey 
must be able to live in a way which ensures, so far as possible, 
that public officials, doctors, teachers, landlords and others treat 
them with the courtesy due to every member of the community.60 
For someone in a position of dependent engagement, far more will 
normally be at stake if they are convicted of an offence relating to their 
benefit claim, by way of contrast with a taxpayer who commits an 
analogous offence in relation to their liability to pay tax.61 This is so, 
even though in theory both such people may wrongfully risk to the same 
extent an excessive diminution of the common pool of resources in 
question. The plain fact is that, as Steve Uglow observes: 
The welfare claimant…has few defences since all the 
circumstances of his life may be under public scrutiny. The 
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claimant may also carry a “moral taint” as a person unable to earn 
a living.62 
Dependent Engagement and the ‘Ordinary’ Citizen 
The conditions under which the false statement which constitutes 
“fraud” is made are…very different for taxpayers and for…benefit 
claimants. These conditions reflect differences in power and 
credibility…benefit claimants do not have the knowledge and power 
even to record their own histories and circumstances…If [taxpayers’ 
statements are] later proven false, they often cite innocent error or 
confusion in justification. These excuses are far more likely to refer to 
the experience of benefit claimants, yet are usually rejected.63 
Let me now bring some practical life to the theory. I will begin with 
some figures concerning people’s fitness for meaningful engagement in 
what I earlier called the bureaucratic-participatory state.  
The Department for Work and Pensions (the ‘DWP’) lists a large 
range of factors likely to cause people to struggle to achieve such 
engagement, from rural isolation, through language difficulties, drink or 
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drug addiction, to forms of disability.64 To focus in more detail on some 
of these groups, some 5.2 million adults in England can be described as, 
‘functionally illiterate’, which is to say they have literacy levels at or 
below those expected of an eleven-year-old.65  Such people are the least 
likely of all groups to be in full-time employment at the age of thirty.66  
The problem of illiteracy is particularly marked amongst young people. 
Literacy problems affect 16 to 24-year-olds in England more than in 
almost all the other wealthy countries of the world.67  These problems 
contributed significantly to the figure of 1 in 5 young people being 
unemployed in England.68   By contrast, only 2% of families with good 
levels of literacy live in workless households.69  An even more depressing 
picture can be painted concerning lack of numeracy. Some 15 million 
adults in England have numeracy skills at or below level 3, the skills 
expected of an eleven-year-old, and 6.8 million have skills equivalent to 
(or worse than) a nine-year-old.70  15% of 37-year-olds cannot manage 
their household accounts because of numeracy problems, with a further 
8% saying that they could manage these accounts only, ‘with 
                                                          
64
 DWP, Universal Credit: Local Support Services Framework (DWP, 2013), annex C. 
65
 www.literacytrust.org.uk/adult_literacy/illiterate_adults_in_England, accessed 9
th
 April 2015. 
66
 Deeqa Jama and George Dugdale, Literacy: State of the Nation (National Literacy Trust, 2012), 5. 
67
 England was ranked 21
st
 out of 24 rich countries: All-Party Parliamentary Literacy Group, Report of the Youth 
Literacy and Employability Commission (National Literacy Trust, 2013), 6. 
68
 www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05871, accessed 9
th
 April 2015. 
69
 See n. 68. 
70
 Every Child a Chance Trust, The Long-Term Costs of Numeracy Difficulties (London: Every Child a Chance 
Trust, 2009), 7. 
33 
 
difficulty’.71   Unsurprisingly, poverty exacerbates these problems, with 
37% of children who attained below level 3 numeracy skills eligible for 
free school meals, compared with 17% of all children.72   
To an unknown extent, such significant disadvantages may overlap 
with problems arising from the so-called ‘digital divide’. Children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds are less likely to use the internet than their 
more privileged peers, and working class children are more likely at 13-
years-of-age never to have used the internet in their lives, or to use it 
infrequently.73  In that, of course, these children join a pre-war 
generation at the other end of the age scale, brought up before the 
post-war emergence of a consumer culture, whose disengagement is 
likely significantly to affect their life chances if it is exacerbated by 
factors such as social disadvantage.74 Recent evidence shows that only a 
small proportion of benefit claimants use the internet to operate the 
benefits system,75 whereas 84.5% of tax returns are completed online.76 
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Such people’s opportunities for meaningful engagement in society 
may be limited by the tendency of bureaucratic forms of organisation to 
use standardised procedures, and top-down methods, that are not well-
adapted to such people’s needs,77 a point highlighted in the much-
praised Oakley Review of Jobseekers Allowance sanctions.78 More 
broadly - when at school, unemployed or pensioners - such people are 
likely also to be dependent, in their engagement with society, in the 
political sense identified earlier. That is to say, for them, the very 
possibility of an engaged, autonomous life depends directly on 
discretionary decisions made by – amongst others - the state’s 
bureaucratic bodies, in relation to (for example) schooling, benefit and 
basic pension policy.  In this context, that is significant. Information 
provision will inevitably prove crucial, if society’s inclusive ends, with 
regard to providing the conditions for the realisation of people’s 
autonomy, are to be attained by the bureaucratic entities charged with 
delivering those ends. Someone’s limited ability to provide key 
information accurately, or at all, obviously threatens to frustrate those 
ends and may further impoverish that person’s life.79  As the House of 
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Commons Work and Pensions Committee remarks, confronted by an 
insufficiently sensitive bureaucracy, the most disadvantaged people may 
find themselves being, ‘set up to fail’.80  
This is the background for my main concern: the penalisation of 
the failure by people who are dependent, in the sense just outlined, to 
provide the information required of them by the bureaucratic-
participatory state. In particular how, if at all, does the bureaucratic-
administrative system of law containing benefit offences and penalties 
tackle failures to provide information by those at a disadvantage when 
seeking to provide it? What role, if any, should be played by the 
provision of a lack of dishonesty or reasonable excuse defence? 
No Excuses: the DWP’s Iron Fist and State Domination. 
Social solidarity involves, amongst other things, the sharing of risks and 
responsibilities; but with the sharing of risks come risks of sharing.81 The 
bureaucratic-participatory state is always likely to place some emphasis 
on seeking, through punitive means, to address the risks of sharing, as a 
way of buttressing the acceptability of sharing risks. Kees  Schuyt argues 
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that, when the state creates a rule-governed bureaucracy to share risks 
through benefit provision, one of the risks of such sharing will be the 
spawning of free riders and what Schuyt calls ‘calculative citizens’ who 
make illegitimate use of a bureaucracy’s well-intentioned rules.82  There 
will consequently be pressure to change the rules to exclude the former 
(the free riders), and to deter the latter (‘calculative citizens’) through 
the use of appropriate offences. There is in fact scant evidence of 
significant numbers of ‘calculative citizens’ defrauding the benefit 
system.83 Even so, the DWP does not see that as a reason to downplay 
the importance of the ‘risks of sharing’ problem: 
The…DWP takes benefit fraud very seriously. Although the vast 
majority of people who claim benefits are honest, those who steal 
benefits are picking the pockets of law-abiding tax payers. In 
2010-11, benefit thieves stole an estimated £1.2 billion from public 
funds, that’s why we are determined to catch them.84  
Were the DWP concerned solely, as surface appearances suggest, with 
genuine fraud or theft in relation to benefits (both offences of 
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dishonesty) then perhaps this passage might pass muster, morally 
speaking. However, the DWP’s rhetoric is highly misleading. 
In particular, the DWP wrongly sweeps, into the category of what 
it calls ‘benefit theft’, offences committed when someone intentionally 
fails to inform the DWP that they are now living with a partner, that they 
have undisclosed savings, that their children have left home, that they 
have started work, that they have inherited money, that they are going 
abroad, or that they have changed address.85  There is no need for 
proof of dishonesty in relation to all these offences, even though some 
benefit offences do require such proof.86  An example where there is no 
requirement of dishonesty is the net-widening offence created by 
section 16(3) of the Social Security Fraud Act 2001: 
A person shall be guilty of an offence if— 
(a) there has been a change of circumstances affecting any 
entitlement of his to any benefit or other payment or advantage 
under any provision of the relevant social security legislation… 
 (c) he knows that the change affects an entitlement of his to such 
a benefit or other payment or advantage; and 




 See, for example, the offences in the Social Security Fraud Act 2001, s 16(2). 
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(d) he fails to give a prompt notification of that change in the 
prescribed manner to the prescribed person.87 
A criminal prosecution under this section is undertaken by the Crown 
Prosecution Service (‘CPS’), which will – as in all cases - apply a test of 
whether the prosecution is in the ‘public interest’, alongside the 
evidential sufficiency test.88  One possible result of CPS consideration of 
the public interest in prosecution may be a decision to refer a case back 
to the DWP for the application of an administrative penalty for this 
offence. Such a penalty will be imposed by the DWP, ‘where 
appropriate’:89  
It is current DWP policy to offer these penalties where the case is 
deemed to be not so serious and the offer of an administrative 
penalty is considered a suitable alternative to prosecution, and 
where the gross overpayment is under £2,000. Unlike cautions no 
admission of guilt is required from the customer before offering an 
administrative penalty, although there is a statutory requirement 
                                                          
87
 The aggravated version of this offence in section 16(2) does require proof of dishonesty, but even the lesser 
offence may end in a sentence of up to three months’ imprisonment: See, further, 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/s_to_u/sentencing_manual/obtaining_benefit_fraud/, accessed 9
th
 April 2015. 
88
 http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/v_to_z/welfare_rural_and_health_cases/, accessed 9
th
 April 2015. 
89
 Department for Work and Pensions, Penalties Policy: In Respect of Social Security Fraud and Error (DWP, 
January 2015), para 4.3.5. From 8th May 2012 the administrative penalty increased to 50% of the 
amount overpaid subject to a minimum of £350 and a maximum of £2,000. The administrative penalty is 
payable in addition to any recoverable overpayment (para 4.4.2). On the 8th April 2014 the Government 
announced the intention to increase the maximum administrative penalty to £5,000, with the new 
limit being introduced in April 2015 subject to Parliamentary approval (para 4.4.3). 
39 
 
for investigators to ensure that there are grounds for instituting 
criminal proceedings for an offence relating to the overpayment.90 
This is an important discretionary, mesh-thinning power, since the 
overwhelming majority of benefit ‘fraud’ does not involve the kind of 
dishonesty that might bolster the public interest in criminal 
prosecution.91  
Whether the proceedings are criminal or administrative, the 
relevant authorities may withhold benefits themselves as a 
punishment.92 That is a matter of serious concern, because it is unlikely 
that justice can be done in the most sensitive cases through reliance, by 
way of fault element, solely on fault concepts such as knowledge, 
negligence, and the failure to take reasonable steps.93 Offences with 
these kinds of fault element are liable to operate to the severe 
disadvantage of those whose prospects for meaningful engagement in 
society are already limited by illiteracy, innumeracy, unfamiliarity with 
internet processing of information, or all of these. Such people are quite 
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likely to find themselves in a position where they know that changes in 
their circumstances affect their benefit entitlement, but they lack the 
capacity for meaningful engagement that would lead them to give full 
and timely notice of these changes to the relevant authorities. 
Accordingly, in spite of a lack of dishonesty, such people will be exposed 
to effective exclusion from society, if their benefits are taken away as a 
punishment for commission of a benefit offence. Regrettably, then, 
these punitive measures should really be understood less as a means of 
identifying ‘cheats’, and more as a means of coercively reinforcing 
(financial) domination – in the sense described earlier – over those on 
benefits.94 
The Velvet Glove: Excuses under Bureaucratic Law 
Earlier, I suggested that the bureaucratic-administrative system of law is 
reconcilable with the provision of open-ended excuses, but it will tend to 
favour such excuses only where officials – charged with securing the 
public interest – control the circumstances of excuse or exception. The 
maintenance of such executive control is, of course, the hallmark of 
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‘domination’.95 For that reason, this system of law is most comfortable 
accommodating the conditions of excuse through the use of in-house 
official discretion to avoid prosecution at all, when those conditions 
obtain, rather than at the point where sanctions are to be applied. For, it 
is at the latter stage where the intrusion of rights-based Gesellschaft  (or 
ad hoc Gemeinschaft) concerns are most likely to threaten the efficient 
and predictable attainment of policy goals. 
 An example of executive domination arises when DWP fraud 
investigators find that, ‘a significant mental or physical condition is 
suspected at any stage of the investigation.’ In such cases, the question 
whether or not to continue with the investigation is simply passed to a 
senior officer within the DWP.96 The answer to the question is not made 
to hang on, say, an external medical assessment of the individual. 
Further, in soft law setting out the scheme governing benefit for those 
with long-term health conditions - the Employment and Support 
Allowance97  - internal guidance has now been given on safeguards to 
be observed before finding that a claimant had no ‘good reason’ for 
breach of an obligation.98 The guidance says: 
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[…] it is particularly important to consider the welfare of claimants 
who have mental health conditions or learning disabilities, or 
conditions affecting communication/cognition, for example, stroke 
or autistic spectrum disorder.99 
As in the previous instance, no external judgment necessarily intrudes 
on the DWP’s own processes for dealing with such difficult cases. There 
are other examples of the preservation of such executive control of 
excusing conditions. Under the present system governing Jobseekers’ 
Allowance benefits, claimants may seek to avoid sanctions for non-
compliance with work obligations if there was a ‘good reason’ for a 
failure to meet an obligation.100 However, ‘good reason’ is undefined in 
law (although it is understood to include factors such as illness, family 
bereavement,101 and mental health conditions or disorders102). Moreover, 
whether a benefit claimant had a good reason is a matter determined by 
‘a DWP decision-maker’ rather than an independent person or body.103 
Finally, it is also the DWP that will itself reconsider the matter, through a 
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Mandatory Reconsideration Notice, if the claimant believes that the 
initial decision was wrong.104  
In all of these examples, officials must acknowledge – they are 
morally bound to acknowledge – that either ongoing disadvantage, or 
simply the special circumstances of a case, may mean that the 
imposition of a sanction is inappropriate. Yet, in all these examples, in-
house officials remain wholly or largely in control of the circumstances of 
excuse (‘good reason’). This structural dominance of bureaucratic-
regulatory ideology has sometimes proved to be nothing less than a 
shambles, in point of justice. It has been too open to egregious failures: 
as when, for example, a man had an appointment at the jobcentre on a 
Tuesday, was taken to hospital with a suspected heart attack that day, 
missed the appointment, and was sanctioned; or when a man was made 
subject to sanctions when he missed an appointment in order to be at 
his partner’s side in hospital, after she had given birth to a stillborn 
child.105   
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One sound way of addressing the problems generated by 
bureaucratic-administrative domination of sanctioning processes is to 
give ex ante help to claimants to comply with their obligations. This is 
obviously to be preferred merely to seeking ex post  to ensure that 
sanctions are not harshly applied when those obligations may have been 
breached. In fairness to the DWP, it does take these kinds of steps to 
assist potentially disadvantaged claimants. For example, under the 
Universal Credit System, the DWP urges Local Authorities to make 
specific provision (such as a home visit) for claimants with special or 
complex needs, in order to help them through the system.106 Claimants 
also have ‘work coaches’ who are meant to identify and allow for such 
needs when setting conditions that claimants must meet as a part of 
their ‘claimant commitment’ (on which the receipt of benefits 
depends).107 Further, the DWP permits an official ‘appointee’ to claim 
benefit on someone else’s behalf, although only in cases of mental 
capacity or severe disability.108  However, these compliance-motivated 
processes should be set against the broader picture, which is dominated 
by an unholy alliance between the DWP’s aggressively pro-prosecution 
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stance on contraventions,109 and bureaucratic-administrative ideological 
domination of the conditions of excuse. To enhance the fairness of the 
system to some of the most disadvantaged people in society, something 
more thus needs to be added to the compliance-motivated processes.  
Excusing Conditions: Between Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft 
Drawing on the earlier analysis of theft, where information-provision 
benefit offences are concerned, there should be a formal requirement 
for the prosecution to show dishonestly, or a defence of reasonable 
excuse. Such a requirement or defence gives claimants the chance and 
the confidence to say to the independent magistrate or jury that their 
false claim, or failure to provide relevant information, was excusable 
because it was, for example, (a) caused by understandable language or 
numeracy difficulties, (b) the product of the complexity (to them) of the 
information required, or (c) the sheer unreasonableness of insisting that 
the correct information be provided in the way demanded, in all the 
circumstances.110 Giving claimants otherwise subject to state domination 
that kind of chance and confidence is a small but important part of what 
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it means to uphold their dignity as (would-be) meaningful engagers in 
civil society, entitled in republican terms to treatment as an equal.  
At one time, the courts were prepared to read in a requirement of 
dishonesty to knowledge-based benefit offences. Courts did this on the 
grounds that the real evil at which such offences were aimed (as they 
saw it)  was dishonest claiming. Those who simply ‘did not think 
through’ the known financial implications of their actions should not be 
caught by the offence.111 That approach was short-lived. It did not 
survive statutory reforms to benefit entitlement in the 1970s, and is no 
longer tenable in so far as it relates to statutes – like the Social Security 
(Fraud) Act 2001 -  that place offences requiring proof of dishonesty 
cheek-by-jowl with offences within the same scheme that have no such 
requirement. From the 1980s onwards, a statutory requirement for proof 
of knowledge on D’s part either (a) that his or her actions would or 
might have implications for benefit entitlement, or (b) that a statement 
made by D was or might be false, came to be regarded by the courts as 
a sufficient fault requirement.112 The former approach should be revived 
and embodied in legislation governing all benefit offences; but in itself, 
that would not be enough. 
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Alongside this change of offence definition must come a 
weakening of bureaucratic-administrative control over the 
interpretations of terms such as ‘good reason’ or ‘reasonable excuse’. 
Perhaps ironically, one model is provided by the current system for 
imposing a penalty of £50, when a benefit over-payment is due to 
claimant error. Under this system, the penalty may be imposed, 
amongst other circumstances, where: 
2. a person has been overpaid as a result of failing, without 
reasonable excuse, to provide information or evidence required in 
connection with a claim for or award of benefit;  
3. a person has been overpaid as a result of failing, without 
reasonable excuse, to notify a relevant change of circumstances.113 
‘Reasonable excuse’ is defined quite widely to include, ‘a credible reason 
or justification’,114 something that might easily cover the sources of 
disadvantage mentioned above.115 Just as significantly, in the present 
context, an official finding that there was no reasonable excuse, or that 
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reasonable steps had not been taken to correct an error, is subject to 
appeal to an independent (first tier) tribunal.  
The crucial significance of this latter point is that such an appeal 
procedure permits the independent tribunal to act like a jury or 
magistrate judging the dishonesty of someone’s conduct. The tribunal 
can consider an individual’s circumstances on their merits, detached 
from the priorities set by bureaucratic-administrative public interest 
goals.116 Such a procedure should be in place for all administrative or 
civil penalties, of the kind considered above. In the power that it gives 
the tribunal to counter bureaucratic public interest priorities in individual 
cases, the independent tribunal procedure is inspired by elements of 
both Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft forms of law. On the one hand, 
justice can be Gemeinschaft  in character: administered on a case by 
case basis, looking at the conduct as that of a whole person, a person 
subject to vulnerabilities, pressures, confusions, disabilities, or other 
disadvantages, but also a person with at least some capacity 
meaningfully to engage with their community and society. On the other 
hand, when justice has this character, it is also rightly open to use by a 
claimant as a means of asserting, in Gesellschaft  fashion, their right to 
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treatment with dignity, and their right treatment as an equal, free from 
both subjection to bureaucratic imperatives and community prejudice 
against benefit claimants.117 
Sanctions: Between Citizens and Bureaucrats 
During the 20th century, the extent and complexity of the bureaucratic 
state has increased (as has the number of tailor-made regulatory crimes 
that support the bureaucratic state’s operation118), along with its 
tendency to permit wide-scale administrative specialisation. Inevitably, 
that has led in many areas to civil service – or delegated agency - 
‘monopolies’ on the expertise and knowledge necessary to ensure 
regulatory compliance.119 Indeed, the legitimacy of our greatly enhanced 
bureaucratic-administrative state in part depends on the pretensions of 
its officials to such knowledge. Famously, Max Weber went so far as to 
suggest that: 
Bureaucracy naturally prefers a poorly informed, and hence 
powerless, Parliament, at least insofar as this ignorance is 
compatible with the bureaucracy’s own interests…[Even] the 
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absolute monarch, too, is powerless in the face of the superior 
knowledge of the bureaucratic expert…120 
 Yet, as supposed repositories of the expert knowledge that 
underpins their authority, bureaucracies face persistent legitimation 
crises. As long ago as 1973, Sir Kenneth Wheare commented in his 
Hamlyn Lectures that: 
For officials as for citizens the technicality is so great that only a 
few experts can be expected to understand it. It is not surprising 
that officials make mistakes in this area. It is not necessary to 
have recourse to theories of conspiracy against the citizens' purse 
or of intentional obscurity in the publications of the Department of 
Inland Revenue to explain why that Department heads the league 
table for complaints of maladministration from taxpayers. In the 
administration of social services, similarly, there is a great measure 
of unavoidable complication in the rules and decisions covering 
unemployment insurance, entitlement to payments, supplementary 
benefits and so on which is extremely difficult for the average 
official to understand, much less explain, to the citizen.121 
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Since Wheare’s time, there have been repeated calls for better 
communication between officials and claimants, particularly in relation to 
the applicability of sanctions,122 and in some respects governments have 
responded to such calls.123 However, Wheare’s words still have a 
resonance, in a world in which regulations to be administered have 
become more ever more prone to change (sometimes, ironically, in the 
name of simplification),124 in which the number of civil servants 
responsible for that administration at the DWP has fallen by 23% since 
2010,125 and in which researchers have found more generally in the civil 
service, ‘an eroding culture of service delivery’.126 
 From these developments, I draw two conclusions, bearing in 
mind the state’s immense and special power over the lives of individuals 
at the financial margins, in the field of benefit entitlement. First, unduly 
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heavy-handed or otherwise unjust penalisation of substantively 
blameless benefit claimants, in particular, will never wholly be prevented 
by well-meaning ex ante guidance.127 Secondly, it follows that ex ante 
guidance should be supplemented by a requirement to prove dishonesty 
in benefit claim-related offences, or such offences should be subject to a 
reasonable excuse defence.  In the case of penalties, this requirement 
or defence should be central to the decisions of any independent 
tribunal empowered to hear appeals against penalties. This will ensure 
the magistrate or jury, in the former case, and the independent tribunal 
in the latter case, can challenge bureaucratic imperatives. They can do 
this by seeking to a pursue a Gemeinschaft-inspired form of justice, 
evaluating individual conduct case-by-case, considering it in context and 
in the light of the individual as whole person. It is through such a 
process that the Gesellschaft-inspired, republican power to assert one’s 
right to respect for personal dignity, and to treatment as an equal (in 
contrast to ‘equal treatment’), best finds its expression. 
Conclusion 
Finally, and more broadly, something should be said about bureaucracy 
and public policy, when it comes to the role of prosecution in both tax 
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and benefit claim cases. In the continuing debate about tax and benefit 
fraud, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that the core functions of the tax 
and benefit authorities are not prosecutorial. These core functions are, 
of course, distributionally consequentialist: revenue collection and 
benefit conferral, respectively. It follows that, putting aside instances of 
genuinely fraudulent, systematic and well-organised abuses128 (which 
are comparatively rare129), so far as both these core activities are 
concerned, the predominant goal in relation to alleged breaches should 
be  negotiation to secure compliance or restitution. In relation to that 
predominant goal, finding ‘cheats’ through the gathering of evidence for 
a potential prosecution is merely a secondary or auxiliary  goal. The 
realisation of the predominant goal should shape and define the 
ideology and practice of the relevant bureaucracies when dealing with 
alleged wrongdoers in both tax and benefit contexts.  
This is so, even though tax fraud accounts for no less than 69%, 
as a proportion of the £20 billion annual cost of public sector fraud.130  It 
can be argued that, as Christine Parker suggests in the different context 
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of cartel offending,131 what has been lacking in this context is not the 
adoption of a more punitive approach. What has been missing is a 
sustained, public and political commitment to (a) instilling in people the 
moral importance of compliance, and (b) the provision of the resources 
and other backing needed to develop confident and determined officials 
skilled in the use of regulatory techniques to secure such compliance. 
For example, the Oakley Review recommended that the DWP: 
Work with experts in communication and behavioural insights to 
test whether variations in the style and content of letters could 
boost the proportion of claimants who open and engage with the 
letters they have been sent.132 
What remains to be shown is that the ‘distancing’ between officials and 
their constituents, that an emphasis on crime and penalty-creation and 
aggressive prosecution brings about,133  will prove effective at producing 
a greater degree of compliance in either the tax or the benefit context, 
without causing a great deal of disproportionate and unjustified pain. 
Apart from anything else, such an emphasis is liable to falter simply 
because it goes against the bureaucratic ‘grain’: 
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Certain bureaucrats identify with disadvantaged constituents, such 
as the poor or the disabled. Other bureaucrats identify with 
regulated firms, perhaps because they interact so often with the 
firms’ representatives.134 
                                                          
134
 William T Gormley Jr and Steven J Balla, Bureaucracy and Democracy: Accountability and Performance, 3
rd
 
Edition (Sage, 2013), 52; Gregg Review, n 128, summary. 
